The Kremlin’s announcement earlier today that President Vladimir Putin will not be attending the G-8 summit in Camp David on May 18-19 comes as a surprise. This is a most recent decision, as all indications were that Putin had accepted President Barack Obama’s invitation.
In an extraordinary gesture, Obama’s National Security Advisor Tom Dillon met Putin in Moscow on the eve of the latter’s taking over as president. The White House statement conveyed that Dillon had ‘constructive’ discussions on US-Russia relations. It referred to “consultations on mutual strategic interest”. Evidently, the topic of missile defence figured.
The Kremlin has rubbished the speculation that Putin chose to skip the visit to the US to avoid embarrassment over western criticism regarding ‘democracy deficit’ in Russia. Interestingly, Putin has nominated prime minister-designate Dmitry Medvedev to represent him. A tongue-in-cheek remark said “During Medvedev’s work as the president, Russia-US relations have experienced a notable progress, ad the work on that direction is to be continued.”
Curiously, Putin also had a phone conversation with Obama on Wednesday, which was described as a “constructive conversation” by the Kremlin. So, what prompted Putin’s decision to drop out, finally? In all probability, missile defence poses a formidable obstacle in the Russia-US discourse.
One of the first acts by Putin after taking over as president was to issue a decree affirming that Moscow will remain consistent on its policy to seek “guarantees” that the US missile defence system will not be “directed against Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces.”
Without doubt, Putin would have factored in that Obama hopes to showcase the G-8 summit at Camp David for political mileage in the US presidential election campaign. The ‘downgrading’ of Russia’s representation at the summit will be invested with political symbolism when things look somewhat grim on the missile defence issue. Indeed, Putin is scheduling a visit to China in June.
In G-8, Japan and Russia are the two non-NATO nations.
Two major factors played out after the Second WW. First was the expansion of Soviets to included many a European nations and Asiatic landmass. Second, the fall of KMT in China to military onslaught of Maoists and its expansion to Tibet and Sinkiang. This looming military expansion of Communists threatened civil democracy and free market economy, and the perceived risk was its expansion to all colonized nations in Asia and Africa.
This political threat was countered by a variety of responses, which included peaceful transition of power to many nations including India, military alliances like SEATO and CENTO besides NATO in Europe. A policy of intervention in many nations, e.g. Iran, Pakistan was also a component in the response, and so was direct military intervention in Korea, Vietnam etc. The Indian experiment with non-alignment was also accepted as inherently non-threatening and implicitly friendly.
Difficulties inherent in inclusion of Russia in G-8 needs to be seen with this backdrop. The tendency to see Russia as a defeated nation is much too high. The policy of intervention in Germany and Japan and its subsequent co-option with imposition of a set of policy constraints is hard to resist in case of Russia.
The woolly headed Gorbachev with his imaginary role of Russia in Asia-Pacific century and restructuring of tottering Soviet system accelerated its collapse. Yeltsin who rode the tiger of Russian nationalism, and Soviet dissolution, also almost invited intervention as a defeated power. It was President Putin who defied to contain such an interference and assert Russian destiny once again. Such strength is respected, but not liked by those who sought intervention nor by those can not read the tea leaves correctly.
The political risks of shaping representative opinion for evolving policies in such a complex scenario is much too high for US policy makers. Prez Obama whose post-election promise to now PM Medvedev was leaked, followed suit with a publicized delayed congratulation to Prez Putin. His contender Mr Romney recently characterized Russia as the strategic enemy number one.
But these posturing need not be taken seriously. Mr Romney is a person with excellent scholastic credentials and governance track record. Like Prez Obama, he can be expected to take reasoned, mature and sensible policy measures if elected.
Russia, has yet to evolve as a free society with a multiparty democracy, and its free market economic institutions are fragile. Though the potential for knowledge based modern economy is excellent, its economic expansion has primarily been in commodity supply sector. To create an internal environment which invites investments, social interactions, and spur change processes affecting its economic and consequently its internal polity is not easy. Specially since there are real risks to her stability by admitting unchecked trust as proved in Yeltsin era.
Perhaps G-8 convergence need to begin with changes to internal policies. If so, the fact that Prez Putin does not attend is not significant, what may really matters is the internal policy measures he initiates in Russia.
The Chinese internal logic of historicity of its claims be it Sinkiang, Tibet or S China Sea recently, poses a long term grave risk to Russia at Sino-Siberian borders. After post-Cold war dissolution, Russia perhaps sought to reduce this threat by making peace with China and selling military equipment.
The logic of 69 friendship treaty however remained valid and continuation of the strategic partnership over the decades lends credence to this interpretation. May be the tea leaves shall be read correctly this time and the efforts to re-set US-Russia shall succeed.
Such a re-set, consequent G-8 consolidation, and 69 friendship treaty can have a significant bearing on ushering harmony to the vast tract comprising Middle-East , CIS States and SAARC region.
G-7 re-purposed itself to when it expanded to G-8. Attaining those objectives is still work-in-progress. May be parallels can be drawn from how for physicists , the classical world view had to give way to Quantum mechanics. It took decades, and frustrated Planck even suggested that most die-hard resistors would go to their graves with their classical beliefs! Reality recognition can not easily overcome acquired perceptions. Complex emotions, unyielding suspicions, genuine doubts, apprehension about unknown risks remain. Let us not forget the nature and dimension of destructive potentials deployed on both sides of deterrence. A mis-computation is still unaffordable.
Prez Bush had famously said, that he looked into Putin’s eyes and knew he could trust him. In that visit Putin even exhibited the Cross his mother gave to him! Efforts to bridge the gap and carry both nations seemed sincere but for trust to percolate downwards and reach beyond Snowian corridors of power to main streets of towns and cities, to shape arts and commerce, is no easy. Our democracies are not that efficient yet, nor our elected leaders that credible.
Thereafter a reset to the relationship was attempted again, and a second try is on card again. Re-purposing G-8 may need this reset first. This backdrop of inherent complexity in design and working of institutional linkages can not be brushed aside with sweeping sentiments of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai , nor it could be subjected to cold war manipulation of real kind, euphemistically called ping-pong diplomacy. For arts, sciences and businesses to thrive, the need for consolidation of European destiny is a critical factor, and towards such purposes G-8 was probably directed. A slow go on this count presently may help more to attain the goal.
G-20 on the other hand is of recent vintage. Conceived during that later years of Bush administration, is a fora for economic decision making and global economic stability. G-20 represents 90 percent of global GDP but its clout despite its size is less due to low cohesiveness. Presently many nations in G-20 are closer to Russia than G-7 nations.The underlying dynamics it can unfold for Russian relationships are contradistinctive but not conflicting with the G-8 goals. It is a totally different cup of tea.
It might also be due to the fact the Putin and his United Russia’s party had openly criticized the alleged US led western backed opponents in the anti Putin’s rallies and opposition strikes through out the election process during his re election to President’s office.
This is not a surprise (Mr Putin not attending G
. There has been NO resentment between the two big powers, and the reset was never warranted as there has been no issue to begin with ! Missile defense and Syria / Iran are all bogus arguments. Putin simply wants to stay away, so he is not suspected to be still part of this very strong nexus, and this fast approaching new world order. That’s all there is.
“… The ‘downgrading’ of Russia’s representation at the [Camp David] summit …”
“… Putin is scheduling a visit to China in June …”
The former downgrade upgrades the latter (to his “first” after inauguration).