Bharat Rakshak

Improving ties with Nepal: Need to understand the complexities

by S. Nihal Singh

The Tribune
July 14, 2009

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090714/edit.htm#5

With Nepal embroiled in the turmoil of making a post-monarchical system work, India�s shadow over the country has grown, rather than diminished. Indeed, there are so many layers in the complex relations between the two countries that that they are never far from the political debate that has raged in Nepal over the decades, as it is raging now.

In a brilliant recent study of India-Nepal relations, a Nepali journalist with wide international exposure* has made a path-breaking examination of the complexities, misunderstandings, prejudices and conflicting and merging interests of the two countries. Despite the provocative title, Sanjay Upadhya�s is an honest unblinking view, with blame apportioned on both sides although India as the weightier party bears more of it.

Upadhya�s story ends with the Maoists being brought into the mainstream and the waning fortunes of King Gyanendra on the eve of the monarchy being abolished. It is a blow-by-blow account of how the monarchy, interwoven with local politicians and the seemingly overbearing Indian presence, has tried to cope with its own authoritarian ambitions and promoting the country�s interests by its own light.

The older generation of Nepali leaders, of course, were participants in the Indian independence movement. Many of them studied in Indian universities, sought refuge in India during inclement political times at home. And even the Nepali monarch has, on occasion, sheltered in the neighbouring country awaiting more propitious times. Upadhya finds it ironical that, given these links, India continues to view Nepal with the mindset of the Raj.

Yet Upadhya does not shy away from the truth that no one can rule Nepal without reaching an accommodation with New Delhi. Nor does he quibble over India�s legitimate security interests in Nepal. And in highlighting the persistent demand for the revision of the 1950 treaty, he plainly states the problem of retaining its beneficial aspects while making it acceptable to Nepalis� opinion. Despite the secret letters exchanged at the time revealed a decade later, it remains a unique document.

In seeking to explain Nepal to India and the world, the author distinguishes between what his countrymen view as historical wrongs and Indian moves that have adversely impinged on Kathmandu. In the first category is the war with British India in 1814-18 leading to the Sigauli treaty under which Nepal believes it lost a third of its land although some of the land in the Terai was restored to it, thanks to Kathmandu�s help in the 1857 Mutiny, commemorated in India as the First War of Independence. In the second section, the author places Nehru�s action in engaging with King Mahendra and his party-less polity after the Indian debacle in the border war with China, hurting the Nepali Congress more than it helped the Palace.

Upadhya�s contention is that anti-Indian sentiments expressed from time to time are more complex than they appear. They are on occasion manifestations of nationalism; at other times there are specific grievances. The author believes that India�s unfriendly neighbours using Nepal as a conduit for anti-Indian activities, most dramatically manifested in the Indian plane hijacking, is not because Nepal�s rulers want to harm India but due to their lack of will in situations of political instability and deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment.

The China factor in India-Nepal relations is bound to remain a constant and was traditionally employed by the Ranas as well as kings and politicians developing a dynamism of its own after the Sino-Indian border war. Prime Minister Koirala had pleaded for China�s membership in SAARC, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, King Birendra had touted his Zone of Peace proposal, and the first visit abroad of Prachanda as Prime Minister before his resignation was to Beijing, rather than New Delhi.

The author believes that the onus is on Nepal to define the 1950 treaty in the totality of the relationship. But disputes over the demarcation of the border, in Uttar Pradesh in particular, remain an irritant. Differences over trade and transit agreements have also been a perennial feature, with New Delhi finally accepting the Nepali contention that transit for a land-locked country was a matter of right. Nepal�s tremendous hydro-electrical potential and projects have been another source of friction, with Kathmandu believing that New Delhi discourages others� investment and takes more than it gives Nepal.

Many of these problems can be laid at the door of mutual distrust; there is, indeed, a belief in Nepal that it does not know the secret nature of agreements that might have been arrived at by New Delhi with the Ranas, the Palace, mainstream politicians or the Maoists. It is, of course, no secret that India was the midwife who delivered the Seven Party Alliance agreement with the Maoists bringing them into the mainstream some 10 years after they took to the jungles to try to wrest power. The Nepalis tend to give an Indian security twist to this agreement.

It is to the credit of the United Progressive Alliance Government in its first term that New Delhi was more straightforward in presenting its views on India-Nepal problems and perspectives. This has been appreciated although suspicions, shared by the author, remain over whether it is for real. Thoughtful Nepalis understand that New Delhi has vital security interests in what happens in Nepal. At the same time, Sino-Indian rivalry has given Kathmandu greater room for manoeuvre. Being landlocked by India for the most part, a broadening of its relations with Beijing, as with Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a policy shared by most Nepalis.

An overall reordering of relations between Nepal and India must await the resolution of the present stalemate between the main political parties and the Maoists. In Kathmandu, there is distrust of Indian intentions whereas for New Delhi there are red lines Nepal should not cross. Given the disparities between the two countries, a measure of resentment and defensiveness on the part of Nepalis is understandable. The problem is accentuated by the intimacy and religious and cultural affinities of the two peoples who share an open border. Quarrels between cousins are proverbially fierce and difficult to resolve. Upadhya has made his contribution by speaking his mind and pointing a way towards a more harmonious relationship.

*The Raj Lives � India in Nepal by Sanjay Upadhya; Vitasta Publishing Private Ltd, New Delhi; pp 334.

China�s King-Size Card In Nepal

By Dipankar Biswas

Our wizards of smart are once again rejoicing in their success in Nepal. The Maoists have been dislodged from power. A supposedly India-friendly face � Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninists, this time � will be at the helm of affairs. And all will be hunky dory.
Those who fall on the same stone twice deserve to have their necks broken, it is said. But not we Indians when it comes to our tiny northern neighbor. We have been running around in circles, squandering away our interests and initiative. Never has India lost so much ground in Nepal than under the UPA government. Just when it was being thought that the Congress would come out with a new policy on this long-running front, we find the same people � our S.D. Munis, Ashok K. Mehtas and K.V. Rajans � directing policy.
First things first: The China card. Throughout their decade-long insurgency, the top leaders of the Nepalese Maoists found succor and sustenance on India, more so on account of ideological soulmates rather than on any official Indian hospitality. Yet Indians stand accused of aiding and abetting the rebellion. We facilitated the anti-monarchy alliance�s rise to power. Yet we sulked when Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda made it a point to snub us by visiting China first.
What went unnoticed during that brouhaha was the red-carpet treatment Chinese Premier Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and other leaders gave the Maoist leader, especially amid their tight schedule surrounding the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games. Ever since, it has been downhill for India in Nepal. Yet we still find time to berate the monarchy for its penchant to flaunt the �China card�
A dispassionate look clearly suggests that India could never have had a better friend in Nepal than the monarchy. In outlook and affinity, there was much in common. Sure, several kings were egregious in seeking to cozy up to the Chinese. Yet we never stopped for moment to consider that that was a two-way street. At least Maoist leader Prachanda, a politician, could go on Indian TV and tell us that he had not invited any of the Chinese delegations descending on Kathmandu so frequently.
Indian bravado has been misplaced since our supposed �success� in Nepal in 1988-1989. Rajiv Gandhi could twist the monarchy�s arms and get away with it because the Deng Xiaoping was reeling from western criticism of the Tiananmen Square massacre and eyeing a border deal favorable to Beijing at the same time. Sure, the Chinese could not save King Birendra�s active rule despite the fact that the root of the India�s displeasure were the arms Beijing sold to Kathmandu. But the wily Chinese did not lose ground in Nepal. They simply outsourced their job to the Inter-Services Intelligence.
If we were indeed so resolute about asserting our security interests all the way to the southern foothills of the Himalayas, we could have incorporated Nepal into the union. Alas, that time has long since passed. But the challenges have multiplied.
Mercifully, we Indians have woken up to the Chinese tactics. They seek to lull us into complacency by feigning a normal relationship but then continue undermining us in every way possible. All indications suggest that Nepal will become a more prominent platform for this rivalry. But we Indians are happy how the Prachanda�s fall prevented the signing of a new peace and friendship treaty between Kathmandu and Beijing. What we should be worried about is the number of cards the Chinese still have up their sleeves.
An important one is the monarchy. The Chinese have been very quiet about the monarchy, their traditional friend. Now that Prachanda feels he has been victimized by India, could he make common cause with the palace? If the Chinese do end up facilitating a palace-Maoist alliance, would Prachanda and his people support a referendum on the monarchy? In the past, the Maoists have said they would accept the verdict of the people on the people.
Anyone with a basic familiarity of Nepalese history recognizes how notoriously fickle the public mood there is. Amid the general chaos abetted by political ineptitude of the new republican leadership, more and more Nepalis seem to be nostalgic for the good old days when power cuts were the exception rather than the rule. Should the Chinese succeed in placing a referendum on the Nepalese political agenda, there is a good chance we Indians would be surprised by the extent of the support for the monarchy. The question is, can we do anything more?

Rise Of Maoists In Nepal: Implications For India

By B. Raman
August 9, 2008
South Asia Analysis Group

(Paper presented at a seminar organised by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, 2008)

The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, met Nepal's caretaker Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala on the margins of the summit conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) at Colombo on August 3, 2008, and reportedly assured him of India's continued support to Nepal's democratic transition. During the meeting, Manmohan Singh told Koirala that he was impressed by the steps taken by Nepal to usher in democracy, including the conduct of the Constituent Assembly elections on April 10.

2. At the time Koirala went to Colombo to attend the summit, an agreement on the formation of a new Government continued to elude the major political formations in the newly-elected Constituent Assembly. In fact, the decision taken by Koirala without allegedly consulting the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) to represent Nepal at the summit had become a matter of major controversy. The Maoists, who constitute the largest single grouping in the Constituent Assembly, and the CPN--UML felt that Nepal should have been represented by the newly-elected President Ram Baran Yadav and not by the caretaker Prime Minister, whose days in office were numbered. Ultimately, the Maoists and the CPN-UML had agreed to Koirala attending the summit after he reportedly apologised for not consulting them in the matter in advance. This controversy brought into focus once again the suspicion and distrust, which continued to mark the relations among the major political formations after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, with the Maoists smelling an Indian-inspired conspiracy to deny them the fruits of office.

3. However, after the return of Koirala to Kathmandu from Colombo, the main political parties agreed on August 5, 2008, to form a national unity Government led by the Maoists, who will be joined by the Nepali Congress, the CPN---UML and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) that represents the people of the Terai region bordering India. The Maoists reached an agreement with the leaders of the other three parties to head the coalition after what was described as ``breakthrough'' talks by Jhala Nath Khanal, the General Secretary of the CPN - UML. According to Khanal, the leaders of the four parties agreed that the coalition will remain in office at least until the Assembly approved a new constitution, a process that may take two years to complete.

4. The talks on Government formation had gone through so many ups and downs during the last four months that any optimistic conclusion that the suspicions and distrust, which had dogged the talks till August 5, would now be a matter of the past could be misplaced. Before the controversy relating to Koirala's participation in the SAARC summit, there was another controversy caused by the election on July 24, 2008, of Ram Baran Yadav, an ethnic Madhesi, as Nepal's first President defeating a Maoist candidate. Following this, the Maoists had withdrawn from the talks on Government formation in a huff. It took some time and efforts to cajole them back into the talks. The interim Government, which paved the way for the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the declaration of Nepal with a population of 26.4 million as a Republic on May 28, 2008, after ending 240 years of the monarchy, had earlier this year agreed to give the Madhesis greater representation in state and local administration in order to end 16 days of strikes and protests that paralyzed Terai and led to fuel and food shortages in Kathmandu. The Terai region is Nepal's agricultural heartland and, according to the Madhesi leaders, it accounts for 48 per cent of the country's population and 80 per cent of its commercial and industrial activities. It is the main transport link to India, Nepal's biggest trading partner.

5. If the latest agreement does not break down, Puspa Kamal Dahal, the Maoist leader known as Prachanda, is expected to lead the national unity government as Prime Minister for the next two years. The CPN (Maoist) holds 220 seats in the 601- member Constituent Assembly, double the number of its nearest rival, the Nepali Congress. With less than forty per cent of the seats, its role in policy-making----whether in relation to the new Constitution or in relation to Nepal's domestic and external issues--- should normally be limited. But what it lacks in terms of seats in the Constituent Assembly will be sought to be made good by it through its well-motivated and well-trained cadres, who would try to enable the party to have its way in matters relating to its agenda through muscle and street power when the voting power is found inadequate.

6. In the list of the irreducible minimum of its agenda is the integration of suitable members of its trained army into the Nepal Army, thereby giving Nepal for the first time an ideologically indoctrinated army. A People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Nepal will be the dream of Prachanda. Will the other three political formations be able to resist the Maoists' plans to reorganise the Army and make it the tool of the ultimate capture of total state power by the Maoists? That is the first question, which ought to be worrying Indian policy-makers.

7. In the new Government, which would guide the initial steps in Constitution and policy-making, the Maoists will be in the driving seat of power, but not yet in total control of it, but total control will be their ultimate aim. The Maoists have reached where they are now through a mix of the Chinese and Soviet tactics. Through Chinese-style armed peasant power, they established control over large parts of the rural areas, but when control of Kathmandu and the Indian-influenced Terai region eluded them, they joined the other political formations in a democratic street agitation, which gave them their present share of power. In Russia, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin rode to power piggy-back on the Mensheviks. After having got a share of the power and the exit of the Tsar, they kicked the Mensheviks out and established a dictatorship of the proletariat, which was to last for nearly 74 years. Is a similar scenario possible in Nepal? That is the second question which should preoccupy our policy-makers. Would such a scenario be in India's interest? If not, should India actively, but discreetly work to prevent it? Who could be its objective allies if it decides or is forced to do so?

8. Prachanda has taken pains to reassure India that it will have nothing to worry about due to the rise of the Maoists to power. Political equidistance between India and China, but not economic equidependence has been the central theme of his pronouncements. Nepal's economic links with India are so strong that there would be no danger of their dilution as a result of Nepal's closer relations with China, he says. He told Karan Thapar of the CNN-IBN in an interview on May 20,2008 when he was asked what sort of relations he would be looking at with India: " A new relation on a new basis. The new base has been laid down with the understanding from Delhi. A new unity with Delhi is already in process. A new relation means better relations, understanding and cooperation. We want to come closer to New Delhi on the basis of new relations. I always said that there is a special relationship with India, geographical and cultural, and therefore we should have a special relationship with New Delhi. No one can ignore this historical, geographical and cultural fact. What I am saying is that we will not side up with one country against the other. We will maintain equidistance in political sense and not in terms of cooperation and other things. The culture, history and geographical relationship that Nepal has with India will remain intact. It is a historic fact and we will have to strengthen this relationship."

9. However, there are two issues relating to India on which his heart and mind are set. The first relates to the re-negotiation of the 1950 Indo-Nepal treaty and a general review of all other bilateral agreements with India. He told Karan Thapar: " Our people have put forward this concern that they feel that the treaty (of 1950) lacks in equality and that it is not beneficial for Nepal. We thus want to review all the points of the 1950 treaty. And we want to revise it according to new necessity." When asked whether he wanted to drop the provisions for open border and the national citizenship status for the people of Nepal in India, he was evasive and said: " Not exactly right now. There are other provisions that we want to discuss in detail." He indicated that one of these provisions requiring re-negotiation would be the defence purchase provision which requires Nepal to consult Delhi and only then acquire arms. He added: "That also should be reviewed and should be made according to the necessity of the 21st century."

10. Karan Thapar then drew his attention to a statement made by Babu Ram Bhattarai, his party colleague, to the "Nepal Telegraph" on May 10, 2008, that it was only because of the open border that Nepal could not achieve economic prosperity and asked him whether he agreed with that. He was again evasive in his reply. He said: "In the transitional phase, right now with the processes going on, it (Bhattarai's view) is not correct." Prachanda added: " I want to have a general review on all the treaties. But specifically I want to review the 1950 treaty. We want changes in the 1950 treaty, others may be okay, or may be revised, but we want to generally review them. We want to strengthen relations by re-negotiating."

11. The other issue relating to India on which his heart and mind are set is the re-examination of the question of recruitment of Gurkhas to the Indian and other foreign armies. He told Karan Thapar:" We want to discuss this issue. We don�t want to stop it right now. We want to review the whole history of the development and the implication on both countries. What kind of relation is created through this institution is what we want to review. We want to review and discuss it. I think this will be debated in our Constituent Assembly. It is an important topic. Now we are about to draft a new constitution and that will guide us for Nepal�s vital interest. These are historical questions. We will have to review it in that perspective. Here in Nepal there was feudal autocracy as a political system. Now we are changing that into a democratic system, and we are looking at rapid economic development so that our youth don�t have to look for employment in other countries. We want to change the political and economic scenario."

12. What are the present ground realities regarding Nepal's relations with India and China? Nepal's exports to India constitute about 55 per cent of its total exports and its imports from India about 44 per cent of its total imports. There are over 265 approved Indian joint ventures in Nepal of which over 100 are operational, with a cumulative total Indian investment amounting to between 36-40 per cent of the total Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal. The total project cost of these 265 projects is around Rs.28.5 billion, with fixed investment amounting to Rs. 21.9 billion and the foreign investment component amounting to Rs. 7.427 billion. These joint ventures are in practically every sector, including tourism, infrastructure, consumer durables & non-durables and export oriented industries like garments and carpets. A number of Indian companies, including Dabur, Hindustan Lever, Colgate, etc., have established their manufacturing base in Nepal with the objective to export their finished products to India. It needs to be added that these statistics taken from the web site of the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu relate to the period till 2002-03. The figures must have further gone up since then.

13.The initial focus of India's economic assistance was on infrastructural projects, involving the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and airports. While infrastructure continued to remain the priority focus, projects also began to include health, industrial estates and other sectors. About 80 per cent of the Mahendra Raj Marg, a highway that runs the entire length of Nepal (1024 kms.) from the east to the west along the southern terai, has been constructed by India. In addition, roads from Kathmandu to Dakshinkali, Trishuli, Balaju, Godavari and Raxaul via Hetauda, Sunauli to Pokhara, Rajbiraj to Koshi Barrage and the Janakpur town road are contributions of Indian assistance. India has also constructed a number of bridges on these roads and separately two bridges on the river Bagmati at Kathmandu and one on the river Mohana. The bridge on the river Sirsiya between the towns of Raxaul on the Indian side and Birgunj on the Nepalese side has also been completed and opened for traffic. Twenty-two other bridges were constructed with Indian assistance on the Kohalpur-Mahakali Sector of East West Highway.

14. The total value of trade (exports plus imports) between India and Nepal is about 48 per cent of the total trade of Nepal with foreign countries as against about 10 per cent only in the case of Nepal and China. The total number of Chinese investment projects in Nepal was 44 only till 2003-04 for which statistics are available as against nearly 300 in the case of India. Of these, 25 were operational, six under construction and the remaining 13 licensed. Chinese investments have been mainly in hotels and restaurants, electronics, radio paging services, readymade garments , nursing homes, hydropower, civil construction, etc. China has helped Nepal in the construction of 11 roads with a total length of about 600 Kms as against nearly 1500 kms in the case of India. China has also been helping Nepal in the construction of one hydel project, one irrigation project and two electrical transmission projects.

15.In 2001, China and Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Tourism Cooperation, including Nepal into the list of the tourism destinations for outbound Chinese travelers. Subsequently, the two countries signed an "Air Service Agreement", according to which, Air China opened a direct air link between China and Nepal in 2004, by the route of Chengdu-Lasha-Kathmandu. In addition, the China Southern Airline has also started operating an air service between Guangzhou and Kathmandu since February, 2007. Likewise, the Nepal Airline is operating air services between Kathmandu and Shanghai and Kathmandu and Hongkong.

16.Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the Nepal Army started sending officers and soldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007 , 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to China for training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.

17. While China's relations with Nepal have been expanding over the years, they are nowhere near the multi-faceted relationship between Nepal and India. In terms of value and usefulness, Nepal's relations with India have been more significant than its relations with China. Nepal has benefited far more from its privileged economic relations with India than vice versa. If a Maoist-dominated Nepal tries for equidependence in its economic relations with India and China, it will be lifting a huge boulder and throwing it on its own feet. Prachanda gives the impression of realising this, but not many others in the CPN (Maoist). Bhattarai blames the open border with India for Nepal's backwardness. One does not know how sincere is Prachanda when he talks of the importance attached by him to Nepal's relations with India.

18. Pro-China intellectuals in Nepal make no secret of their dislike for India. Chinese officials and diplomats keep emphasising that China's relations with Nepal are based on the three principles of trust, equality and sincerity. They thereby hint that while China treats Nepal as an equal partner, India does not.

19. Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5, 2008, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said: "Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia." That is the reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us. China is not a South Asian power, but it already has a growing South Asian strategic presence----- in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is hoping to acquire a similar presence in Nepal with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government. It has already acquired the status of an observer in the SAARC. Some in the SAARC would ultimately like to make it a SAARC member to counter the presence and influence of India. Nepal in the past refrained from joining those working for the inclusion of China in the SAARC. A Maoist-dominated Government may do so in future.

20. China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the road network in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising these ideas, the threats to our security will be enhanced. China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It is hoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They have been in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt. funded Radio Free Asia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama, these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping to pre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.

21. India will find itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China for political influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there will be a second player in China. In Myanmar, whenever the military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose the Chinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the military junta in international fora such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt. will choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.

22. The relations of the State of Nepal with the State of Pakistan are miniscule and hence of no major concern to India at present. What is of concern to India even now and may be of greater concern in future are the activities of the Pakistani and Pakistan-based non-State actors against India from sanctuaries in Nepalese territory and the growing presence and activities of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from Nepal. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the Khalistani organisations based in Pakistan used to operate through Nepal. So too the jihadi organisations in the 1990s and thereafter. Pakistan-based mafia groups like the one of Dawood Ibrahim have active supporters in the Muslim community in the Terai region of Nepal. After the Mumbai blasts of March, 1993, some of the perpetrators fled to Karachi via Kathmandu. Large amounts of black money from India are laundered in or through Kathmandu, which is also a nodal point for the pumping of counterfeit currency notes by the ISI into India. Some years ago, the Government of India reportedly came to know that a cable TV network, which was to come up in Nepal, was actually funded by Dawood Ibrahim. Timely intimation of the information to the Nepalese authorities resulted in the withdrawal of permission for the project. Nepalese co-operation in counter-terrorism, counter-money-laundering and mutual legal assistance are important for our intelligence and investigation agencies.

23. This co-operation and assistance were facilitated in the past by good police-to-police relations. Many of the old generation Nepalese police officers were trained in Indian police institutions. They networked well with their counterparts in India --- informally as well as formally. Under a Maoist-led Government, this co-operation is likely to become more and more formal and less and less informal. Over- formalised co-operation is often not very effective in the absence of the informal component.

24. Prachanda and others are yet to come out with detailed formulations on what would be Nepal's relations with the US under a Maoist-led Government. The US Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have already established lines of communications with the Maoists. The first priority of the US would be to discourage the Maoists from moving too close to China. This would also be in India's interest. The first priority of the Maoists will be to have the name of the CPN (Maoists) removed from the list of terrorist organisations maintained by the US. This should not be difficult since the CPN (Maoists), unlike the LTTE of Sri Lanka, has not been formally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under a 1996 US law.

25. What impact will the decision of the CPN (Maoists) to give up its armed struggle half-way through and join the democratic mainstream have on the spread of Maoism across the tribal belt of Central India? Not much. The ideological and material dependence of the Nepalese Maoists on their Indian counterparts was more than the other way round. The Indian Maoists, while complimenting their Nepalese counterparts for their good performance in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, have at the same time been expressing their skepticism over the success of the experiment being attempted in Nepal. Indian Maoists seem to expect that the Nepalese experiment will not work and will come unstuck.

26. The Maoists have done well in the elections, which were widely perceived across the world as free and fair. The voters of Nepal have preferred them over other parties, which had failed to come up to their expectations in the past. A Maoist-led Government is the freely-expressed choice of the voters. India has no other option but to work with it so long as its policies do not take a blatantly anti-Indian dimension, which would be unacceptable to India. However, if the policies of the new Government do acquire such a dimension, India should have the courage and confidence to be able to have the situation rectified with the help of its well-wishers in Nepal. Despite all that has happened, there is still a large reservoir of well-wishers of India in Nepal. They should be nurtured and encouraged to be active---not for undermining the Maoists, but for preventing anti-Indian distortions.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.)

Threat on India's northern border

By Bharat Verma
Organiser
July 27, 2008

Despite invasion of Tibet, New Delhi did not understand the significance of the Chinese communists growing up as a military organisation, unlike other communist movements. Their core competency lay in the PLA and military virtues were promoted throughout the cadres. If China today dares to claim Arunachal and piece of Sikkim, it is primarily based on its military prowess. New Delhi�s portrayal of the humiliating defeat at the hands of Chinese in 1962 as �betrayal� and �surprise� is untrue. The pacifist Indian leadership that was crying hoarse from rooftops for friendship at any cost remained blind to Communist China�s repeated claims on Tibet and large part of Indian territories. Mao termed Tibet as the palm of a hand with its five fingers as Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan, and NEFA. He claimed that these were Chinese territories that needed to be �liberated�. Tibet was �liberated� by force while New Delhi slept.

The historical characteristics of the Chinese and the statements issued by the Communists from time to time clearly exposed their expansionist ambitions in Asia that spelt direct threat to India�s well being. Despite such overt indications, if we could not prepare ourselves to meet those challenges, the fault lies with us. Instead of pretending to be surprised or betrayed, it is time we face the truth for the fiasco in 1962 and prepare our military for the serious threat posed by the Chinese.

To Mao and the Chinese what singularly mattered was achieving the final goal. The means whether fair or foul to win were irrelevant. If New Delhi had deciphered what Mao was advocating in 1946 and studied the historical Chinese characteristics, alarm bells should have clearly rung in the South Block.

Mao repeatedly said from 1950 onwards that Taiwan, Tibet, and Hainan Islands were Chinese territories and they will be re-possessed. The predominant trait in this claim is the Chinese attraction for acquiring new territories. On take over by the Communists, maps depicting large parts of Korea, Indo-China, Mongolia, Burma, Malaysia, Eastern Turkestan, India, Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan as Chinese territories were produced. Despite such demands, New Delhi always overlooked the basic fact that Communists inherited both, the traditional Chinese expansionism as well as imperialism.

Tibet and China that were part of Mongolian Empire at one point in history now became part of the Chinese Empire under Mao, in reverse order. Strangely, from this it follows that since Tawang or Sikkim which have been closely related to Tibet in the past, needed to be �liberated� and made part of the new Chinese empire. If the leadership of independent India had bothered to study and understand the British mantle that was inherited, Chinese aims would become crystal clear- Mao the great strategist, always announced his goals publicly and never wavered.

Further Mao often quoted a famous Chinese saying, � �If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then east wind will prevail over the east wind.� This clearly indicates another trait of the Han Chinese -their obsession to dominate other nations in their vicinity. If Nepal in history paid tribute ever as a vassal state to the Chinese Emperor, than whenever the regime in Beijing was powerful, it would ensure Nepal accepts its orbit of influence. With Maoists taking over Nepal, the designs of the Communists in China have succeeded and pacifists in New Delhi stand compromised on our geo-political interests.

While Indians were bending backwards to force their friendship in the last fifty-eight years, China was busy consolidating its hold on Tibet and other occupied territories. It extended its influence in Asia through economic and military power, unprecedented development of logistic infrastructure and demographic invasion. By 1987 it poured in 75 million Han Chinese into Manchuria, 7 million in Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), 8.5 million into Inner Mongolia, and 7.5 million into Tibet. Similarly it bolstered itself against India militarily by building roads up to the borders in Tibet and connecting Sinkiang province by cutting a road through Indian Territory Aksai Chin. Yet we were not alarmed as a nation and continue to swim in the euphoria of five principals of Indo-Chinese friendship termed Panchsheel!�

Historically Indian and Chinese influences in Asia have coexisted. However, possibly for the first time in history, India and China were rising almost simultaneously. This produced two contenders for the leadership of Asia. On the chessboard, while Nehru took the initiative to lead Asia- without developing military sinews and powerful international alliances- through The Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and a second Conference on Indonesia in 1949, a year later, Mao�s army executed liberation of Tibet in one masterstroke.

Mao, thus demonstrated to the world that China was the actual leader of Asia and India merely a paper tiger, good for holding conferences but incapable of defending a small country in its vicinity. He also understood strategic importance of Tibet, which provided the base in Himalayas, from where a large part of Asia could be engulfed in its sphere of influence.

Despite invasion of Tibet, New Delhi did not understand the significance of the Chinese communists growing up as a military organisation, unlike other communist movements. Their core competency lay in the PLA and military virtues were promoted throughout the cadres. If China today dares to claim Arunachal and piece of Sikkim, it is primarily based on its military prowess. On the other hand, the fine Indian military machine built by the British continues to be degraded and demoralised by the Indian civil leadership�its like axing the branch one sits on.

Traditionally Chinese leadership leans on teachings of Master Sun Tzu. Mao in particular was highly influenced by Sun Tzu, who said, ��To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy�s resistance without fighting.�

Therefore, a willing proxy was found in Pakistan. For the first time in history, nuclear weapons and missile technology were transferred to countervail and further boost its hatred against India. Of course, we all know how preoccupied Pakistan has kept our national security managers and resources, while Chinese developed a free run in Asia.

Similarly Maoists in Nepal supported clandestinely by the Chinese are in cahoots with the Indian Maoists who now control 40 percent of India�s territory. If you think that�s not smart enough for warriors of Sun Tzu, than take a look at the borders from North to East
-Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar are under the spell of Beijing, shrinking India�s influence in its own vicinity without recourse to war. Its matter of time before Chinese upstage Bhutan and Sri Lanka may go the Chinese way due to our inaptitude.

China, over a period of time, has cleverly managed to deploy two authoritarian streams of threats against India to break its will and the territorial integrity. Foremost is the Communist threat that originates from Beijing and the second is the Islamic fundamentalist threat from its proxies. Besides these two, there are other threats like Nepal Maoists or getting the Indo-US Nuclear deal blocked by their comrades in India.

Today for China to threaten Arunachal Pradesh and demand a slice of Sikkim after assured of its vice-like grip on India is a natural progression, even as New Delhi continues its slumber.

In 1999 the Dalai Lama in hindsight admitted, � When Tibet was free, we took our freedom for granted�In former times Tibetans were a war-like nation whose influence spread far and wide. With the advent of Buddhism our military prowess declined�� The Dalai Lama could easily have said the same for India.

Pacifist philosophies may be good for the individual�s soul but are suicidal for nation�s security.

(The author is editor, Indian Defence Review)

� 2004 Bharat Prakashan(Delhi) Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Red flag over Nepal boosts Naxals' morale

8 Jun 2008
Mohua Chatterjee
Times News Network

NEW DELHI: The Maoist victory in Nepal seems to have greatly boosted confidence of the Left extremists in India, which could only imply more trouble for the government in dealing with Naxalite violence.

A secret meeting of the central committee (CC) of the CPI-(Maoist), held after results of elections in Nepal were declared, declared in a triumphant tone: "The verdict in Nepal is a verdict against feudal monarchy, Indian expansionism and US imperialism � it reflects the growing aspirations of the Nepalese masses for land, livelihood and democracy."

In the CC statement, the Naxalites also sent out a message to their cadre to "oppose moves of the imperialists, particularly US imperialists, and Indian expansionists to meddle in the affairs of Nepal."

"It is the aspirations of an overwhelming majority of masses that trounced the parties that had either supported the king and/or the Indian ruling classes, or hesitated to come out strongly against feudal, imperialist oppression and Indian intervention in Nepal," the CC statement said.

The CC welcomed an alternative like CPN (Maoist) coming to the fore in Nepal, with its "commitment to abolish the feudal monarchy, abrogate all unequal treaties signed with India by the former ruling classes of Nepal, ensuring democracy and equality for oppressed sections of society like Dalits, adivasis, minorities and women."

The CC hailed the Maoists in Nepal for routing �feudal, pro-imperialist, pro-Indian comprador parties' and voting for a genuine change in the "rotten feudal system", the statement said, sending "its fraternal revolutionary greetings for their victory against the reactionary forces."

The CC has warned the Nepalese Maosists saying, "the real test, however, begins now after the CPN(M) taking over reins of power. No radical restructuring of the system is possible without the smashing of the existing state."

The CC has suggested to the CPN(M) to beware of the conspiracies of imperialists led by the US, Indian 'reactionary ruling' classes, and the 'feudal comprador' forces of Nepal to engineer coups, political assassinations, creation of artificial scarcity through economic blockades and sabotage, and subversion of the democratic process, and called upon it to be fully prepared to confront these reactionaries through armed means.

In the written statement, the CC also strongly condemned the Indian 'expansionists' in trying to create public opinion prior to the elections in favour of the Koirala clique.

"They went so far as to get the national security adviser, Narayanan, to openly state on TV that they favour a Koirala victory. They also got the media to propagate cooked up opinion polls putting the Maoists at third place and blacking out media reports when the Maoists began to sweep the polls, upsetting all their calculations," the statement read.

Copyright � 2008 Times Internet Limited. All rights reserved.

BOOK REVIEW: A Journey Into The Nepalese Mindset

By Dipankar Biswas

The Raj Lives: India In Nepal. Sanjay Upadhya. Vitasta: New Delhi, 2008. 350 pages. Rs.645

The urgency of a dispassionate debate on India-Nepal relations has never been greater. Yet cogency is becoming a scarcer commodity. Despite the tumult of the past six decades, prominent Indians still admonish their government to �understand� Nepal. In terms of Nepalese scholarship, cogency is in shorter supply. Pick up a book with a name as confrontational as this one�s and you more or less know what you are getting into.

One does not have to embark on a historical excursion to grasp the extent to which anti-Indianism influences the collective Nepalese consciousness. This can be gleaned sufficiently from the two-year-old peace process in the Himalayan nation. After King Gyanendra seized absolute power in February 2005, he moved swiftly to snub India by, among other things, veering closer to China. Beijing reciprocated to this brazen flaunting of the China card, describing the takeover as an internal matter.

The aggrieved mainstream Nepalese political parties, discredited by their own incompetence during 12 years of democratic rule, turned to India for support. The Maoist rebels, having captured much of the rural hinterland during a decade-long insurgency, had failed to subdue the capital. They, too, swallowed their virulence and looked to India for an initiative.

From the outset, New Delhi recognized that the only way Nepal could regain democracy and peace was through a working alliance between the mainstream parties and the Maoist rebels. The concern was to prevent the Maoists from hijacking the democracy movement and imposing a communist dictatorship. The palace�s arrogance continued to exceed all bounds, primarily because of its confidence in India�s unwillingness to countenance such a decidedly awkward configuration.

When King Gyanendra, behind India�s back, colluded with the leaders of Pakistan and Bangladesh to induct China as an observer to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a sizeable section of the Indian public was outraged and clamoured for action. Indian officials have not fully revealed the extent of their role in facilitating the alliance, which was explicitly committed to the restoration of multiparty democracy. The mainstream Nepalese parties as well as the Maoists have suggested it was significant.

Whatever the precise role of India, the approach worked. Amid a nationwide popular uprising, King Gyanendra capitulated. Over the succeeding months, the mainstream parties and the Maoists signed a comprehensive peace accord. The former rebels are now part of a government that has pledged to create a new democratic and inclusive Nepal. New Delhi has consistently vowed to help Nepal�s transition and has been providing funds and expertise in such priority areas as health, education and communication. And what has India ended up with? The enmity of all the political players.

The author, Sanjay Upadhya, has offered chronological narrative centered on British and independent India�s alleged transgressions upon its small northern neighbour. He concedes at the outset that he makes no new revelations. The specific symbols of Indian �highhandedness� he weaves through the text � the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, the 1951 Delhi Compromise, the Kosi, Gandaki and Mahakali treaties on sharing water resources, among others � have been heard in various forms over the decades.

In �The Raj Lives�, Upadhya has attempted to compensate for lack of originality by quoting a wide range of secondary sources. Yet his choice is far from impeccable. For much of the post-1950 period, he has quoted American news media and other western sources, which had their own profound biases against India as the Cold War was thickening. When quoting Nepalese sources, especially after the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990, he has relied primarily on known India-baiters.

The British Raj, to be sure, may have pursued egregiously iniquitous policies on Nepal, but Indians cannot be blamed for that. They were, after all, direct and far worse victims of colonialism. As far as Upadhya�s core contention that independent India virtually upheld the Raj�s policy is concerned, the record shows that New Delhi, like any other world capital, has carefully weighed its national interest in a volatile neighborhood. Upadhya, in this sense, contradicts his core contention by seeking to deny India the right to sovereign decision-making.

This litany of grievances would undoubtedly provide material for anti-Indian quarters in Nepal. The title is ostensibly aimed at attracting a wider South Asian audience similarly prejudiced against India simply for being what it is. New Delhi cannot make apologies for its regional preponderance. Nor can it revert to the kind of non-reciprocity the misguided Gujral Doctrine entailed.

Yet Indians � public officials and the people in general � must remain alert to the workings of the Nepalese mind-set because of the fertile ground it provides to the Chinese, Pakistanis and other quarters inimical to India. In this sense, at least, �The Raj Lives� comes as a useful resource.

India Worries Over Inflow Of Fake Currency From Nepal

NEW DELHI, March 25 (UPI) -- India says the flow of fake Indian currency into the country from neighboring Nepal is a matter of concern.
''We have seized counterfeits of a huge amount during 2007-08 ... it is a matter of concern,'' said Gopal Sharma, director general of the Shastra Seema Bal, a paramilitary force that guards India's borders with Nepal and Bhutan.
He said smugglers were bringing in both crude and highly sophisticated counterfeits into the country.
"Fake currency was seized throughout the year ... the amounts in small numbers had been constantly brought in,'' Sharma said.
He said the Reserve Bank of India, India's central banker, provided the SSB with only a limited amount of fake currency to train its personnel to detect counterfeit currency.
''More fake currency is required to train our men spread across various training establishments in identifying it in actual conditions,'' he said.

� 2008 United Press International. All Rights Reserved.

India Silent As China Deploys Forces On Nepal Soil

Indrani Bagchi
Times News Network
26 Mar 2008

NEW DELHI: Despite the huge diplomatic snub by China as it summoned India's ambassador at 2am on Saturday to protest against Tibetan activists breaking into the Chinese embassy in Delhi, the government here is silent on the reported deployment of Chinese troops in Nepal.

According to reports, China stationed forces on the Nepalese side of the border with Tibet last week, in order to keep tabs on protests by Tibetans in Nepal over the past few days.

The Chinese forces were in plainclothes, but armed with small weapons, sources said. This has rung alarm bells in India's security apparatus, but there's no official reaction.

The government maintained a grim silence on the major diplomatic snub inflicted by China when its foreign office summoned Indian ambassador to Beijing, Nirupama Rao, at 2am to give her a list of demonstrations that Tibetans planned to organize in India.

While this could just as well have been done during working hours, summoning the envoy in the middle of the night is seen here as nothing short of utter high-handedness by the Chinese.

Meanwhile, global strategic analyst Stratfor said Beijing was disturbed by the sight of foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee and US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice jointly addressing the Tibet issue in Washington.

Copyright � 2008 Times Internet Limited. All rights reserved.

China�s New Assertiveness in Nepal

By Bhaskar Roy
October 8, 2007
South Asia Analysis Group

In an interview (June 17) to the publication �Nepal� the new China Ambassador to Nepal, Zheng Xialing, said �China shall not tolerate any foreign intervention in Nepal�. Ambassador Zheng explained, �Whenever the Nepali people face any problem or difficulty, China shall treat them as our own especially when the problems pertain to sovereignty or territorial integrity (emphasis added).

A reading of the text of the interview leaves no doubt that it was carefully prepared in advance by the interviewer and the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu to convey certain messages to India and, also, apparently to the USA. For example, the interviewer recalled Chinese Vice Premier Marshall Chen Yi had said China would not tolerate foreign interference in Nepal, and asked whether that policy had changed.

Other important questions included China�s concerns on Free Tibet campaigners� activities in Nepal, acceptance of Nepal as a republic and US views of Maoists as terrorists. This interview can be considered as glimpses into China�s readjusted foreign policy towards Nepal after the fall of King Gyanendra and the monarchy. Zheng Xialing�s observations are not idle statements of a senior diplomat, but highly significant and meaningful.

Nepal has been one of the important elements in China�s Indo-Himalayan strategy to ultimately push the de facto Sino-Indian border from Kashmir to Bhutan closer to India�s heartland. Nepal is one of the �five-fingers� strategy of late Mao Zedong. It spells Beijing�s influence and control over Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. To the �five fingers�, there are indications that a �toe� is being added. Some of the Tibetans who have been won over by the Chinese are locating along the Indo-Himalayan belt from Ladakh to Sikkim. Kathmandu is one of the very important centers for meetings between China operatives and their Tibetan contacts from India.

Returning to Ambassador Zheng Xialing�s assurance to protect Nepal�s sovereignty and territorial integrity including from foreign intervention in Nepal, the hardline from Beijing is unmistakable. To this was the added reference to Marshall Chen Yi�s similar statement of assurance in 1962.

Reference to 1962 is of particular importance. The Chinese propaganda machinery frequently claims that India�s �illegal� incursion deeper into Chinese territory was dealt a humiliating blow by the Chinese army, the PLA.

In the context of Nepal, Zheng�s statements, obviously cleared by Beijing, does border on not so camouflaged warning to India over Nepal�s affairs.

There is a territorial problem between India and Nepal over Kalapani, which is with India. The matter was thought to have been a settled issue, till Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly encouraged the Nepalese governement and Palace to reopen the issue during his official visit to Kathmandu in December, 1996. Almost immediately following President Jiang�s visit the Nepalese reopened the issue with India both officially and through public protests. According to reports, the Kalapani issue has not gone away and friendly Chinese delegations visiting Nepal allegedly remind the Nepalese periodically. The policy is to keep the fire burning slowly till the time comes to raise the intensity and get it raging.

Nepal had three main pillars, and a fourth one was growing. Beijing nurtured all the three i.e. the Palace, the Royal Nepalese Army (now Nepalese Army), and the Nepali Congress (NC). Given the historic importance of the monarchy, especially the belief among the common people that the king is the reincarnation of the God Vishnu on earth, the Palace was Beijing�s first choice for friendship. The army leadership was with the Palace and, hence, scripted for Chinese coalition. The NC was a different issue, with its traditional linkages with India, but NC leaders tried to maintain a balance between Beijing and New Delhi. The CPN (UML), among the left parties became particularly close to the Chinese. The CPN (Maoist) had a problem, having gone underground, fighting the monarchy from 1990. That, however, does not mean the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu did not have any contact with the Maoists. They did, but very carefully.

During the people�s uprising led by the Maoists from 2000, Beijing made a strategic policy mistake, something uncharacteristic for them. They believed the Palace with the army would prevail again, and remained openly pro-Palace. But unlike India, China had already set up some controlled institutions in the country through their old friends, but fully controlled by Beijing through their embassy in Kathmandu.

The Nepal � China Study Centers (NCSC) and fully funded by China and locally supervised by Madhav Nepal, CPN (UML) leader. While the head office of NCSC in located in Kathmandu, the branch offices numbering now more than seven are located close to the Indian border. These centers are involved in anti-India influence peddling, collection of information, promoting China etc. But the NCSC members can be much more damaging. Their potential to create mischief in the Terai region is enormous, and they can remain undetected. The Terai region is already restive, with no united stand even among the Madhesis.

Another Chinese institution is Nepal-China Mutual Co-operation Society (NCMCS). Again funded through the Chinese Embassy, the co-ordination has been entrusted to Prof. Ballab Mani Dahal. The main task of the NCMCS is to promote China and denigrate India and other US as colonialists and exploiters.

The perception in India that it has come up on top in Nepal is all very well. Maoist supremo Prachanda is on record to thank India for its support to the anti-monarchy movement. India is also mediating in the political crises in Nepal, which would be construed in China�s strategic calculations as �intervention�. This is exactly what Ambassador Zheng said in his interview that China would not allow in Nepal.

During the end months of turmoil and the initial stages of return of democracy, China decided to allow India to take the front position. China was in no position to put its foot in the swirling political waters in Nepal. It decided to nourish its constituencies, including firming a better relationship with the Maoists. This is expected to be a totally new relationship.

The China-Nepal railway in the making needs to be viewed in terms of a new strategic advantage for China. The railway project should be operational next year, providing greater connectivity both for passengers and goods between the two countries. It would be a handle for the anti-India Nepalese factions, and would erode to some extant Nepal�s total dependence on India for access to sea ports, notwithstanding the cost difference. It may also be kept in mind China is always capable of providing �friendship� prices to �friends�.

The new political crises in Nepal with the indefinite postponement of the Constituent Assembly (CA) polls for a second time on October 5 could create a fertile ground for Chinese covert intervention. China�s friends, the CPN (UML) and the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (NMKP) opposed the postponement of the polls, thus dividing the original seven party coalition. The Maoists reneged on the earlier agreement, demanding the country be declared a republic before the CA elections. The reunited NC is sitting rather ineptly in the middle without taking a firm position. Under these conditions India�s leading role in Kathmandu to bring about a reconciliation and emerge as the chief arbitrator in Nepal�s politics goes against Chinese strategic interests.

Ambassador Zheng�s interview portends not only China�s hard-line policy in Nepal vis-�-vis India, but this is likely to extend in their policies to other countries in South Asia to further compress India in its immediate neighborhood. An inimical neighborhood would hamper India�s development and some of the countries of South Asia may be more than willing to play China�s game. It appears a major foreign policy challenge is coming up. It will not do to sweep things under the carpet. The issue will be too big to hide anywhere. The only answer can be a proactive foreign policy.

(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)

Copyright � South Asia Analysis Group

Nepal Link In Hyderabad Twin Blasts?

Daily News & Analysis
Saturday, September 01, 2007 1:50:00 AM

Naxalite whiff detected in Hyderabad twin blasts
Pre-attack inputs, bomb choice hint at Maoist-jihadi link
Josy Joseph

NEW DELHI: Intelligence analysis of naxalite activity pre-dating the August 25 Hyderabad blasts, and the use of naxal-favoured explosives in that attack have persuaded the security establishment in New Delhi to investigate the possibility of a naxalite-jihadis nexus.

The Hyderabad twin-blasts have been blamed on the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), but no clinching evidence has been unearthed to prove that. Intelligence sources are convinced that the role of naxalites in the blasts must thus be carefully examined. The concern could embolden the hardliners in the security establishment who want naxals to be considered terrorists.

The naxal role in the blasts "cannot be ruled out right now", a senior official told DNA. He said that when intelligence inputs of the past months are read in the light of the blasts, it becomes clear that naxals and Islamic terrorists could be "actively collaborating" in Andhra Pradesh.

The bombs that shook Hyderabad contained neogel, an ingredient that bears the Maoist signature, intelligence sources said. They said neogel was not the ingredient of choice of Islamic terrorists for destructive devices. But the naxals use it often.

On February 28, 2006, a truck (JH-11-A9822) belonging to Maoists was intercepted as it crossed into Nepal from India. Its deadly cargo included 475 kg of neogel-90.

"The explosive used is not the only reason for suspecting a naxal role," a senior intelligence official said. Recent inputs about the naxals' ideological positioning suggests that they may be making common cause with Islamic terrorists.

Resolutions adopted by the CPI (Maoist), the naxal group formed by the merger of the People's War of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, provide "ideological reasoning" for cooperating with Islamic terrorists.

"The naxals could provide logistical support to the local terror groups as a quid pro quo for obtaining sophisticated arms, or as part of a larger understanding," the official said.

The resolution was passed at the 9th Congress of the naxal group in January-February this year. One declaration resolved to extend "whole-hearted support to all nationality movements and their right to self-determination, including the right to secession". The enemy was defined as "Hindu fascists" who were oppressing "religious minorities".

Moreover, recent intelligence from Nalgonda, a naxal hotbed, indicated that a dozen Muslim youths were missing. It was suspected that they had been dispatched to Bangladesh or Pakistan to undergo arms training. Nalgonda is the hometown of Razi-Ur-Rehman, alias Abdul Rehman, the suspected Lashkar member arrested in connection with the attack on the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore.

Besides, intelligence experts point out that naxalite-terrorist collaboration is by no means unusual or unprecedented. In recent times, agencies have found Maoists working with a north-eastern insurgent group to persuade Naga members of a CRPF battalion to desist from serving in Chhattisgarh.

� 2005-2007 Diligent Media Corporation Ltd. All rights reserved.